Theaetetus

This chapter contains a critical objection to the defense of Protagoras given in Chapter 15. Socrates argues that if we assert that a claim is wise to the extent that it promotes beneficial and healthy states, as opposed to unhealthy ones, then this must involve the use of judgment. In other words, there must be a judgment made “about what’s healthy and unhealthy” (49). Yet, as Socrates also argues, “not every creature knows what’s healthy for itself and is capable of curing itself” (49).

Further, there seems to be a dilemma once such judgments are introduced. On one hand, Protagoras must accept that there is an independent criterion for determining whether judgments about what is healthy are true that does not appeal to healthiness itself. However, this would mean abandoning his theory of knowledge. This is because such a criterion would bring back an objective standard of truth to determine what is healthy, one that bypasses the perception of the individual. Alternatively, though, maintaining that each of our judgments is true for us, or still true relatively, invites